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Hello everyone, and welcome to the 18th Security Protocols Workshop. Our
theme this year is “Virtually Perfect Security”, which is an attempt to tie to-
gether three slightly different interlocking strands. The first is the fact that
although we talk about security as if it were some sort of metaphysical property
(so that a system is either secure or isn’t), we all know that really whether a
system is secure or not depends on the context which you put it, and you can
move a system to a different context and change whether it’s secure or not.
In practice, we also usually prove security relative to a particular abstraction,
and the danger is that we have a system that “really” is secure, and then we
discover that the attacker is using a different abstraction. Our attempt to find
abstractions which the attacker can’t fool with this trick with has pushed us into
talking about security using abstractions that are further and further away from
anything that a user might think of as comprehensible or convenient.
This brings me to the second strand. We’re very used to pieces of hardware
or software not providing us with the abstraction we want. The basic service
provided by a micro-processor is pretty useless to an application programmer,
the service provided by a low level network interface is not very useful to anybody
doing systems programming, and the solution that we use is the usually the
same: we build up a series of virtual machines. So long as you keep one eye on the
price/performance ratio, you’re generally OK. I’ve said on many occasions in the
past that you can think of computer science as a branch of pure mathematics in
which the homomorphisms cost money. As soon as we try to use this approach in
security protocols we discover that they don’t layer well at all, but we keep trying
to do it largely because it’s the only trick we have. So we build an authentication
protocol, and we try to build other security services on top of that, and then
somebody else comes along and puts some middle-ware in, and we have to go
back and do it all again. It seems there’s something about the nature of the
abstractions that we’re using for security that we really don’t understand (or
that we’re just not allowing for) when we try to layer.
The third strand is that there still seems to be some hope of knowing whether
we’ve got it right or not when all the endpoints have at least one foot in the real
world. But increasingly we have situations where one of the parties in the proto-
col exists entirely in cyberspace. Second Life is an obvious example of this kind
of situation, but a potentially more worrying one is applications like e-Science,
where you’re doing an experiment, the experiment is entirely in cyberspace, and
the reason you’re doing it is because you don’t know what the correct outcome
ought to be. Thinking about the potential security implications of projects like
this is really quite unsettling.
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There has been some work in the past looking at the extent to which an
attacker (or a legitimate participant) can find out which virtual machine they’re
running on. Attackers, for instance, would quite like to know whether or not they
have been sand-boxed. David Deutsch has made a very good argument in one
of his books1 that says that the universe is in fact a simulation running on an
anonymous computer, and he has an experimental programme that he believes
will prove this; there’s a counter-argument in some of the early works of Hilary
Putnam2 but personally I regard the last word on the subject as the second of
the “Ghost in the Shell” movies3. The question is, does having a presence in the
real world give the attacker an advantage, or is it actually a handicap?
The intention as always is that this should be a workshop and not a confer-
ence, so expect to be interrupted. Conversely if you are interrupted, feel free to
depart from whatever it is you planned to stay when you stood up, and if the
interruption gives the urge to go off on a tangent, please do so. In the interests
of spontaneity and unexpectedness, we’ve already changed the programme, so
please make sure you pick up the new running order.
1 David Deutsch, “The Fabric of Reality”, Penguin, 1997.
2 Hilary Putnam, “Brains in a a Vat”, pp 1–21 in “Reason, truth and history”, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
3 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost in the Shell 2: Innocence
